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Abstract
In this paper we introduce a strategic form model in which cooperation struc-
tures and divisions of the payos are determined simultaneously. We analyze the
cooperation structures and payo divisions that result according to several equi-
librium concepts. We nd that essentially no cycles will result and that a player
need not prot from a central position in a cooperation structure.
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1 Introduction
An important topic in economic research is the question which cooperation structure
between economic agents will form. Another important issue deals with division of
prots resulting from a specic cooperation structure. Since the cooperation structure
that forms can inﬂuence the payos to the players, it is natural to integrate these two
questions.
In the literature there is a number of models trying to link these two questions.
We mention Binmore (1985), Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray,a n dSengupta (1993), Gul (1989),
and Perry and Reny (1994). These papers all explicitly model the negotiation proces
associated with characteristic function games.
Of particular relevance for this paper is the work of Aumann and Myerson (1988)
and Dutta, Nouweland,a n dTijs (1996). Both consider a two-stage model of link for-
mation and payo division. Here we introduce a one-stage model which simultaneously
determines a cooperation structure and a division of the payos.
Aumann and Myerson (1988) introduce a two-stage game for modelling the process
of link formation and payo division. The rst stage models the negotiation process
and results in a cooperation structure. According to an exogeneously given rule of order
pairs of players are given the opportunity to form a link. This link is formed if and only
if both players agree on forming this link. After a link is formed, it cannot be broken
in a further stage of the game. The process of link formation stops when after the last
link has formed all pairs of players who have not yet formed a link have had a nal
opportunity to form a link. In the second stage of the game the payo to the players
is determined according to the Myerson value (Myerson (1977)) of the communication
situation that results from the original game and the links formed in the previous stage.
Aumann and Myerson (1988) conclude that according to this game in extensive form
not necessarily the grand coalition will result, which is often implicitly assumed when
cooperative games are considered.
Dutta et al. (1996) consider an alternative two-stage model of link formation and
payo division, rst introduced by Myerson (1991). As in Aumann and Myerson (1988)
the links form in the rst stage and in the second stage the payo to the players is
determined by an exogeneously given allocation rule. Dutta et al. (1996) consider a
class of allocation rules, which contains the Myerson value. The rst stage is modelled
as a game in strategic form, where each player chooses a set of players he wants to form
a link with. A link between two players is formed if and only if both players want to
form this link. Dutta et al. (1996) nd that every structure can be supported by a Nash3
equilibrium. They also nd that the strategy vector that results in the full cooperation
structure belongs to the set of undominated Nash equilibria and to the set of coalition
proof Nash equilibria. Furthermore, they nd that according to the undominated Nash
equilibrium concept and the coalition proof Nash equilibrium concept only structures
that result in the same payo division as the full cooperation structure, are formed.
In Slikker, Dutta, Nouweland, and Tijs (1996) it is shown that the game considered
by Dutta et al. (1996) is a weighted potential game if and only if the allocation rule is a
weighted Myerson value. Monderer and Shapley (1996) point out that the argmax set of
a weighted potential does not depend on the particular choice of the potential and hence
can be used as an equilibrium renement. Slikker et al. (1996) nd that according to
this equilibrium renement the only structures that form are structures that result in
the same payo division as the complete structure.
The model in this paper is inspired by Borm and Tijs (1992) and the idea that
cooperation structure formation and payo division go hand-in-hand. Borm and Tijs
(1992) introduce a non-cooperative model, where players choose a coalition they want
to join. Furthermore, every player claims an amount he wants to receive for joining this
coalition. It is shown that the strong core elements of a superadditive non-transferable
utility game correspond to the strong Nash equilibria of this claim game.
This paper describes and analyzes a one-stage model of link formation and payo
division. Players claim links they want to form and certain amounts they want to receive
for the formation of a link. Naturally, a player can also indicate he is not willing to
cooperate with a specic player. The eventual cooperation structure and payo division
depend on the links the players are willing to form and whether the associated claims
are attainable.
The goal of this paper is to analyze the structures and payo divisions that result
from the one-stage strategic form model. We will rst consider the Nash equilibria
of this game. Since this results in a relatively large set of solutions we will also use
some renements of the Nash equilibrium concept. Specically, we analyze the strong
Nash equilibria and the coalition proof Nash equilibria. Our main conclusion is that
essentially no cycles will result in the cooperation structure. For a game with at least
three players the absence of cycles implies that the full cooperation structure does not
form. Furthermore, we nd that strong Nash equilibria often result in at least one player
receiving a payo of zero. A coalition proof Nash equilibrium of a three-person game
results, under some mild conditions on the underlying game, in a spanning tree if the
core is non-empty. If the core of the underlying game is empty there exist coalition
proof Nash equilibria resulting in exactly one link. If some severe restrictions on the4
underlying game are satised, the empty graph is also supported by a coalition proof
Nash equilibrium.
The plan of the present paper is as follows. Section 2 deals with denitions and the
formal description of our model of link formation and payo division. In section 3 we
analyze the Nash equilibria and strong Nash equilibria. Coalition proof Nash equilibria
are considered in section 4. We conclude in section 5.
2 The model
In this section we will introduce a new model of link formation. We will rst provide
some denitions with respect to cooperative games and cooperation structures.
Let (N;v) be a cooperative game, where N = f1;:::;ngis the player set and v the
characteristic function, which assigns to every subset S of N av a l u ev( S), with v(;)=0 . 1
Throughout this paper, we will assume that v(N) > 0a n dv ( N )v ( S ) for all S  N.
Furthermore, we will assume that v is zero-normalized,s ov ( f i g ) = 0 for all i 2 N.
A payo vector x 2 IR
N is calledan imputation if x is individually rational, xi  v(fig)
for all i 2 N,a n dxis ecient,
P
i2N xi = v(N). The set of imputations of (N;v)i s
denoted by I(v). The core of the game (N;v) will be denoted by C(v)=f x2I ( v )j
8 SN:
P
i 2 Sx iv ( S ) g .
A cooperation structure is represented by an undirected graph (N;L), with N the set
of vertices and L a set of edges, which we will mostly refer to as links. A link between
two players indicates that these two players can communicate directly with each other.
When two players are not connected directly they might be able to communicate with
each other indirectly, via one or more other players. When two players can communicate
with each other, directly or indirectly, we call these players connected. So two players are
connected if and only if there exists a path in the graph (N;L) between these two players.
The notion of connectedness induces a partition of the player set into communication
components, where two players are in the same communication component if and only
if they are connected. The communication component containing player i is denoted
by Ci(L). The communication possibilities within a subset S of N are described by
L(S): =ffi;jg2Lji;j 2 Sg. This set induces a partition of S into communication
components and the set of these communication components will be denoted by S=L.
Myerson (1977) studied communication situations (N;v;L)w h e r e( N;v)i sac o o p -
erative game and (N;L) a (communication) graph. He introduced the graph-restricted
game (N;vL), dened by vL(S): =
P
C 2 S=L v(C), for all S  N. Communication only
1S  N denotes that S is a subset of N and S  N denotes that S is a strict subset of N.5
occurs within a communication component, so the value of a coalition in the graph-
restricted game is dened as the sum of the values of the communication components of
this coalition in the original game.
In the current paper we are interested in the formation of cooperation structures and
the simultaneous determination of payos. We will model the process of link formation
and payo division as a one-stage game in strategic form. In this integrated approach
players demand claims they want to receive for the formation of links. Let (N;v)b ea
cooperative game. We dene the associated link and claim game Γ(v) which is described
by the 2n−tuple (X1;:::;X n;K 1;:::;K n), where Xi is the strategy set of player i and
Ki the payo function of player i which assigns to every strategy prole c =( c j) j 2 N 2
X:=
Q
j2N Xj ap a y o K i( c )2IR .












j 2 IR + indicates that player i is willing to form a link with player j, and he
claims an amount ci
j for forming this link.2 Furthermore, ci
j = P indicates that player
i is not willing to form a link with player j. Clearly, player i cannot form a link with
himself, so for all strategies ci 2 Xi it holds that ci
i = P.
Consider a strategy prole c 2 X. To determine the resulting payo to the players
we have to determine the cooperation structure that results. Firstly, we determine the
set of links the players are willing to form according to strategy prole c. A link between
two players is in this set if and only if both players are willing to form this link. We will










The graph (N;l(c)) partitions the player set into components. Such a component can
actually be formed if and only if the total payo the players in this component claim
to form the links between them, is less than or equal to the value of this component.
Otherwise cooperation will break down and all players in this component will become
singletons. The set of links that will actually form will be denoted by L(c), so
L(c): =
n
f i;jg2l ( c )j
X











2We restrict ourselves to non-negative claims for two reasons. First, it is intuitive to exclude negative
claims since players seem to be worse o by claiming a negative amount. Second, it holds that if we
allow negative claims in our model, every cooperation structure and payo vector resulting from a Nash
equilibrium can also be supported by a Nash equilibrium with non-negative claims.6
This construction implies that if a player is too greedy by claiming a large amount on one
of the links, this player can end up being isolated, receiving zero payo. So, greediness
is punished severely.
Eventually, the players will receive the sum of the claims corresponding to the links
that are actually formed. So,
Ki(c): =
X
j : f i;jg2L(c)
ci
j;
where the empty sum is dened to be equal to zero.














j2NnfkgXj,a n dK − k( c ): =( K j( c ))j2Nnfkg. Finally, we write





We will now describe some equilibrium concepts. Recall that a strategy prole c 2 X
is a Nash equilibrium if and only if there is no player i 2 N that can improve his payo
by unilaterally deviating from c. We will denote the set of Nash equilibria of a strategic
form game Γ by NE(Γ). We will also consider some Nash equilibrium renements.
A strategy prole c is a strong Nash equilibrium if there is no coalition S  N and




with the inequality being strict for at least one player i 2 S. The set of all strong Nash
equilibria of the game Γ will be denoted by SNE(Γ).
A less restrictive renement is the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE). First we
will introduce some notation. For every T  N and ^ cNnT 2 XNnT,l e tΓ ( ^ c N n T)b et h e
game induced on the players of T by the strategies ^ cNnT,s o
Γ(^ c
NnT)=( ( X i) i 2 T;( K

i) i 2 T)
where for all i 2 T, K
i : XT ! IR i s g i v e n b y K 
i ( c T ): =K i( c T;^ c Nn T) for all cT 2 XT.
In a one-player game with player set N = fig,^ c i2X=X iis a CPNE of Γ = (Xi;K i)
if ^ ci maximizes Ki over Xi.L e tΓb eag a m ew i t hn>1 players. Assume that coalition-
proof Nash equilibria have been dened for games with less than n players. Then a
strategy prole ^ c 2 XN is called self-enforcing if for all T  N,^ c T is a CPNE of Γ(^ cNnT).
Now, the stategy vector ^ c is a CPNE of Γ if ^ c is self-enforcing and there is no other
self-enforcing strategy prole c 2 XN with Ki(c) >K i(^ c) for all i 2 N.7
3 Analysis of the model
In this section we will analyze the model dened in the previous section. Our main
question is which cooperation structures result according to some equilibrium rene-
ments and what are the associated payos. For example, we want to know which payo
vectors in the imputation set of the underlying cooperative game are attainable in the
corresponding link and claim game according to various equilibrium renements.
First we will analyze the cooperation structures that result from Nash equilibria.
Before moving on to the general analysis, consider the following example.
Example 3.1 Let (N;v) be the 3-person game with
v(S)=
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 ; if jSj =1
30 ; if jSj =2
72 ; if S = N
:
Several cooperation structures are supported by Nash equilibria. The empty graph
results from the strategy prole ci =( P;P;P) for all i 2 N. Since no player can
unilaterally enforce the formation of a link, this is a Nash equilibrium. The graph with
only the link f1;2g results from the strategy prole c with c1 =( P;10;P), c2 =( 2 0 ;P;P),
and c3 =( P;P;P). This is a Nash equilibrium and results in the payo vector (10;20;0).
Clearly, there are other payo vectors resulting from Nash equilibria where only the link
f1;2g forms. By symmetry it follows that there exist Nash equilibria resulting in the
unique link f1;3g or the unique link f2;3g.
Now consider a graph with two links, f1;2g and f2;3g. The strategy prole c with c1 =
c3 =( P;24;P)a n dc 2=( 1 2 ;P;12) is a Nash equilibrium that results in the cooperation
structure with these two links and the payo vector (24;24;24). The presence of two
links implies that one player is a middleman, a player who is directly connected with at
least two other players. According to c player 2 is the middleman. Player 2 can break a
link with a player and still remain directly connected with another player. This deviation
possibility restricts the set of payo vectors that can be attained in a Nash equilibrium.
Again note that, by symmetry, it also holds that the other graphs with exactly two links
are supported by Nash equilibria.
Finally, consider a strategy prole c that results in a cooperation structure with three
links. This implies ci













2 = 72, since otherwise every
player could unilaterally deviate to a strategy which gives him a strictly higher payo,






2 = 72 implies that8
at least one player claims a positive amount. Assume without loss of generality that
c1
2 > 0. A restriction for player 1 to receive c1
2 is that player 2 wants to form a link with
player 1. So, whenever player 2 changes his strategy such that he wants to form a link
with player 3 only, player 1 will not receive claim c1
2.S i n c et h ev a l u ev ( N ) can still be
obtained, player 2 can obtain the amount c1









3=K 2( c ), and we conclude that c is not a
Nash equilibrium.
Summarizing, we nd that the full graph is the only cooperation structure that is
not supported by a Nash equilibrium in the link and claim game corresponding to the
3-player game in this example.
2
In example 3.1 we saw that the full cooperation structure is not supported by a Nash
equilibrium. The reasoning that leads to this conclusion can be given for every strategy
prole that results in a cooperation structure with a cycle and at least one positive
claim corresponding to one of the links in the cycle. This implies that in a cooperation
structure supported by a Nash equilibrium only cycles with corresponding claims all
equal to zero can result. We formalize this in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 Let (N;v)b ea nn -person cooperative game and Γ(v) the corresponding
link and claim game. For every strategy c 2 NE(Γ(v)) it holds that (N;L(c)) is cycle-free
or, if (N;L(c)) is not cycle-free, all claims corresponding to the links in the cycles are
equal to zero.
Proof: Let (N;v) be a cooperative game and c 2 NE(Γ(v)). Suppose the graph
(N;L(c)) contains a cycle and suppose that there exists a positive claim of a player
on one of the links in the cycle. Assume without loss of generality that (N;L(c)) con-
tains the cycle (1;2;:::;k;1) and that c1
2 > 0. Let ^ c2 =( c 2
−f1;3g; ^ c2
1; ^ c2






2. Then, it follows directly that
K2(c
−2;^ c
2)=K 2( c )+c
1
2>K 2( c ) ;
and hence, c 62 NE(Γ(v)).
2
The implication of this theorem is that, if jNj3 the full graph will never be
supported by a Nash equilibrium.
In the following theorem we will describe the payo vectors in the imputation set
that, under some mild conditions, are supported by Nash equilibria. From this theorem
and the subsequent example it follows that there exist 3-person cooperative games where
not all payo vectors in the imputation set are supported by Nash equilibria.9
Theorem 3.2 Let (N;v) be a cooperative game with jNj =3 ,v ( N )>v ( S ) for every
S with jSj =2 ,a n dl e tx2I ( v ). Then there exists a c 2 NE(Γ(v)) with K(c)=xif
and only if at least two of the following constraints hold:
x1 + x2  v(f1;2g); (1)
x1 + x3  v(f1;3g); (2)
x2 + x3  v(f2;3g): (3)
Proof: First we will prove the if-part. Assume without loss of generality that the rst
two inequalities hold. Then c with c1 =( P; x1
2 ; x1
2 ), c2 =( x 2;P;P), and c3 =( x 3;P;P)
is a Nash equilibrium with K(c)=x .
To prove the only-if-part, assume that c 2 NE(Γ(v)) is such that K(c)=xand
assume that at most one of the three inequalities holds. Since x 2 I(v), v(N) > 0, and
v(N) >v ( S ), for all jSj = 2, the graph (N;L(c)) is connected. By theorem 3.1 it follows
that exactly two links will form. Let player i be the middleman. Since at most one of
the inequalities (1), (2), and (3) holds there exists j 2 Nnfig with xi + xj <v ( f i;jg).
Player i can improve his payo by breaking the link with the third player, player k,a n d
claiming an amount of v(fi;jg) − xj on the link with player j. Hence, c is not a Nash
equilibrium.
2
We apply theorem 3.2 in the following example.
Example 3.2 Consider the game (N;v)w i t hN=f 1 ;2 ;3 gand
v(S)=
8
> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
0 ; j S j=1
60 ;S = f 1 ; 2 g
30 ;S = f 1 ; 3 g
40 ;S = f 2 ; 3 g
90 ;S = N
:
The set of payo vectors in the imputation set that are obtained from Nash equilibria
can easily be identied using theorem 3.2. The set of these payo vectors is represented
by the shaded area in gure 1 on page 10. Figure 1 represents the imputation set, the




We see in example 3.2 that not all payo vectors in the imputation set can be sup-
ported by a Nash equilibrium. However, every core-element satises inequalities (1),
(2), and (3), and hence, in a 3-player game every core-element can be supported by a10
(90,0,0) (0,90,0)
(0,0,90)
x1 +x2 =6 0
x 2+x 3 =4 0





Figure 1: Shaded area represents the payo vectors in the imputation set
resulting from Nash equilibria in example 3.2
Nash equilibrium. In the following theorem we extend this result to general n-person
cooperative games.
Theorem 3.3 Let (N;v)b ea nn -person cooperative game and x 2 C(v). Then there
exists c 2 NE(Γ(v)) with K(c)=x .








and, for every j 2 Nnf1g
c
j
k = P; for all k 2 Nnf1g
c
j
1 = xj :
This strategy results in a star graph with player 1 as the central player and payo vector
x. We will show that there is no player who can improve his payo by unilaterally
deviating. First, consider an arbitrary deviation by player 1, ^ c1 2 X1. By construction
of c it follows that every player in C1(L(^ c1;c −1))nf1g will receive the same payo as he







j2 C 1( L (^ c1;c−1))
xj  v(C1(L(^ c
1;c
−1))):11
Since, by denition of payo vector K,
X
j2C1(L(^ c1;c−1))
Kj(^ c1;c −1)v(C 1(L(^ c1;c −1)));
we conclude that K1(^ c1;c −1)  x 1. Hence, player 1 cannot protably deviate. Now,
consider player j,w i t hj2N nf1g. The construction of c implies that player j,b y
unilaterally deviating, can be connected with other players via player 1 only. To get a
positive payo player j has to be connected with at least one player. Since the strategies
of the other players remain the same it follows that player j cannot improve his payo
by unilaterally deviating. We conclude that c 2 NE(Γ(v))
2
We have seen that Nash equilibria result in a relatively large set of possible payo
allocations. To restrict the possible payos we look at a subset of the set of Nash
equilibria, the strong Nash equilibria. The following theorem shows that every strong
Nash equilibrium results in a payo vector in the core.
Theorem 3.4 Let (N;v)b ea nn -person cooperative game and c 2 SNE(Γ(v)). Then
K(c) 2 C(v).
Proof: Suppose x = K(c) 62 C(v). Since x 62 C(v) there exists a coalition S that
receives in total strictly less than its value. Let i 2 S. Then the deviating strategy
prole ~ cS with
~ c
j
k := P; for all j 2 Snfig;k2Nnfig;
~ c
j




jSj ; for all j 2 Snfig;
~ c
i










jSj−1 ; for all k 2 Snfig;
results in a strictly higher payo for every player in S,s i n c ev ( S )−
P
k 2 Sx k>0. This
contradicts that c 2 SNE(Γ(v)).
2
The following example illustrates that not every payo vector in the core is supported
by a strong Nash equilibrium.
Example 3.3 Consider the game of example 3.2. First consider the payo vector
(30;30;30), which lies in the core. From theorem 3.1 it follows that if this vector is
supported by a strong Nash equilibrium, then this strategy prole results in the for-
mation of two links and consequently of a middleman. Assume rst that player 1 is
the middleman. Since the payo of player 1 is equal to 30, player 1 claims a positive12
amount for the formation of at least one link. Assume without loss of generality that
this claim corresponds to the link with player 2. So, the strategies of the players are
c1 =( P;c1
2;30 − c1
2), c2 =( 3 0 ;P;c 2
3), and c3 =( 3 0 ;c 3
2;P), provided that players 2 and 3
do not both indicate that they want to form a link with each other, so c2
3 = P or c3
2 = P.
Furthermore, it holds that c1
2 > 0.
We will show that this strategy prole is not a strong Nash equilibrium. Consider
the deviation of players 2 and 3 where they agree on forming a link with each other,
player 2 breaking the link with player 1, and players 2 and 3 dividing the claim c1
2,s o
^ c 2=( P;P;30 +
c1
2
2 )a n d^ c 3=( 3 0 ;
c 1
2
2;P). Since the total amount of claims corresponding
to the two links the players will form according to strategy prole (c1;^ c2;^ c3)i se q u a lt o

















Since all players in the deviating coalition prot from the deviation, it follows that c
is not a strong Nash equilibrium. A similar argument can be given when player 2 or 3
would be the middleman. We conclude that payo vector (30;30;30) is not supported
by a strong Nash equilibrium.
The reasoning for concluding that (30;30;30) is not supported by a strong Nash
equilibrium can be repeated for every payo vector in the imputation set with positive
payos for all the players, since then there has to be a middleman with non-zero payo.
This reasoning does not hold when one of the players has zero payo. For example,
the payo vector (35;55;0) results from the strong Nash equilibrium c with c1 = c2 =
(P;P;35) and c3 =( 0 ; 0 ;P). The payos corresponding to strong Nash equilibria are
shown in gure 2 on page 13.
2
It can be checked that in the previous example every payo vector in the core with
one of the players receiving zero payo is supported by a strong Nash equilibrium. Fur-
thermore, these payo vectors are the only payo vectors that can be supported by
strong Nash equilibria. In the following theorem we generalize this result to n-person
games. Note that if jNj = 3 then the restriction v(N) >
Pm
i=1 v(Si) for every partition
(S1;:::;S m)o fNwith jSij < 3, for all i 2f 1 ;:::;mg, corresponds to v(N) >v ( S )f o r
all jSj =2 . 3
3We remind the reader that we restrict our analysis to zero-normalized games13
(90,0,0) (0,90,0)
(0,0,90)
x1 +x2 =6 0
x 2+x 3 =4 0





Figure 2: Bold parts represent the payo vectors in the imputation set
resulting from strong Nash equilibria in example 3.3
Theorem 3.5 Let (N;v)b ea nn -person cooperative game and Γ(v) the corresponding
link and claim game. Every core allocation of (N;v) with at least one of the players
receiving zero payo can be supported by a strong Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, when
jNj3a n dv ( N )>
P m
i =1 v(Si) for every partition (S1;:::;S m)o fNwith jSij < 3f o r
all i 2f 1 ;:::;mg, there are no other payo vectors supported by strong Nash equilibria.
Proof: Let x be a core allocation of (N;v) and assume xi = 0. Consider the strategy
ci of player i,w i t hc i
k=0f o ra l lk2N nfig and ci
i = P. Furthermore, consider the
strategy cj for the players j 2 Nnfig given by c
j
k = P for all k 2 Nnfig and c
j
i = xj.
So, the players construct a stargraph with player i as the central player and the other
players directly connected only with player i.
We will show that c is a strong Nash equilibrium. Consider a deviating coalition
S  N and a strategy prole ^ cS 2 XS. Suppose there exists a player j 2 S with
Kj(^ cS;c NnS)>K j( c ). Consider the set Cj(L(^ cS;c NnS))nS, the set of players connected
with player j and not in the deviating coalition S. The strategies of the players in
this set were not changed by the deviation of the players in S. So, clearly if player i
is in the set Cj(L(^ cS;c NnS))nS he will still receive zero payo, while every player k 2
Cj(L(^ cS;c NnS))nS with k 6= i can onlybe connected withS via playeri so, Kk(^ cS;c NnS)=
x k.
So, every player in Cj(L(^ cS;c NnS))nS receivesthe same payo as he receivedaccording
to strategy c. This results in the following restriction on the payos to the players in14











However, since x is a payo allocation in the core of the game (N;v),
X
k2Cj(L(^ cS;cNnS))
xk  v(Cj(L(^ cS;c NnS))):







Since Kj(^ cS;c NnS) >K j ( c )=x jthis implies that there exists a player k 2 S with
Kk(^ cS;c NnS)<K k( c ). We conclude that at least one player in S is strictly worse of by
deviating to ^ cS and hence, c is a strong Nash equilibrium.
Now assume that jNj3a n dv ( N )>
P m
i =1 v(Si) for every partition (S1;:::;S m)o f
Nwith jSij < 3 for all i 2f 1 ;:::;mg.
Theorem 3.4 states that K(c) 2 C(v) for all c 2 SNE(Γ(v)). Suppose c 2 SNE(Γ(v))
is a strategy prole that results in a payo in the core with a positive payo for all
players. To obtain a payo in the core, a partition of the player set into communication
components (C1;:::;C m) has to result with v(N)=
P m
r =1 v(Cr). But then there exists
r 2f 1 ;:::;mgwith jCrj3. Consider the players in this communication component.
Every player in Cr receives a positive payo. This implies that there is at least one
middleman, player i, directly connected with at least two players, j and k.S i n c e t h e
payo to this middleman is positive at least one of his claims corresponding to a link that
is actually formed is positive. Without loss of generality assume player j is the other
player forming this link. By theorem 3.1 we know that according to a Nash equilibrium
no link between players j and k results.
Now construct the following strategies for players j and k
^ c






Nnfi;kg) ; with ^ c
j










k := (^ ck
j;c k







This deviation impliesthat players j and k now dividethe claim ci
j, which can be attained
since player i will not receive this claim any more, and communication component Cr
will still form. Since














it is clear that c is not a strong Nash equilibrium.
2
Clearly, a 2-person game with zero value for the one-person coalitions and a positive
value for the grand coalition has strong Nash equilibria in the corresponding link and
claim game that result in positive payos for both players.
The followingexample shows that the condition v(N) >
Pm
i=1 v(Si), for every partition
(S1;:::;S m)o fNwith jSij < 3 for all i 2f 1 ;:::;mg, cannot be omitted in theorem 3.5.
Example 3.4 Let (N;v) be a 4-person game with
v = uf1;2g + uf3;4g:
We dene the following strategies, where the players are divided into two components







j = P otherwise. Clearly, no subcoalition can deviate to a strategy that results in
at least the same payo for all players in the coalition and to a higher payo for at least
one of the players in the coalition. Hence, c 2 SNE(Γ(v)).
2
In the following theorem we describe a class of games where the core coincides with
the payos associated with strong Nash equilibria in the corresponding link and claim
game.
Theorem 3.6 Let (N;v) be a cooperative game with n even and Γ(v) the corresponding
link and claim game. If there exists a partition (S1;:::;S m)o fNwith jSij =2f o ra l l
i2f 1 ;:::;mgand v(N)=
P m
i =1 v(Si)t h e nC ( v )=f xjx=K( c ) ;c 2 SNE(Γ(v))g.
Proof: From theorem 3.4 it follows that C(v) f xjx=K ( c ) ;c2 SNE(Γ(v))g.L e t
x 2 C ( v )a n dl e t( S 1;:::;S m) be a partition of N with jSij =2f o ra l li2f 1 ;:::;mg
and v(N)=
P m
i =1 v(Si). Then it holds for all i 2f 1 ;:::;mgthat
P
j2Si xj = v(Si). We
will construct a strong Nash equilibrium c that supports this core-element. Consider an
arbitrary j 2 Si and denote the other player in Si by k.L e tc jbe the strategy of player
j with c
j
k = xj and c
j
l = P, for all l 2 Nnfkg.O b i v i o u s l y K ( c )=x . Now consider a
deviation of coalition S  N,^ c S.L e tk2Sand denote the communication component
of player k that is formed according to (^ cS;c NnS)b yC k . By construction of c it holds










But then ^ cS cannot be a protable deviation for all players in S, with the payo im-
provement being strict for at least one player in S.T h u s , c 2 SNE(Γ(v) and hence,
C(v) f xjx=K( c ) ;c 2 SNE(Γ(v))g. This completes the proof.
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A partitioning of the player set in a game with an odd number of players results in
at least one isolated player or a communication component with at least three players.
Using theorem 3.5 the following theorem results.
Theorem 3.7 Let (N;v)b ea nn -person cooperative game with n  3o d da n dv ( N)
P m
i =1 v(Si) for every partition (S1;:::;S m)o fN . There exists a strong Nash equilibrium
resulting in payo vector x if and only if x 2 C(v)a n dt h e r ee x i s t si2Nwith xi =0 .
Proof: If v(N) >
Pm
i=1 v(Si) for all partitions (S1;:::;S m)o fN , then theorem 3.5
applies. Now assume that there exists a partition (S1;:::;S m)o fNwith v(N)=
P m
i =1 v(Si). The if-part follows from theorem 3.5 again. It remains to show the only-
if-part. Since n is odd it follows that there exists an i 2f 1 ;:::;mg with jSij =1o r
j S i j3. If jSij = 1 then all core elements attribute zero to the player in Si.U s i n g
theorem 3.4 we conclude that this player receives zero according to every payo vector
resulting from a strong Nash equilibrium. Now assume jSij3 and consider a strategy
prole resulting in communication component Si. This implies that there is at least one
middleman. However, using the proof of theorem 3.5, we nd that in a strong Nash
equilibrium, the middleman will always receive zero payo. Furthermore, theorem 3.4
states that every strong Nash equilibrium results in a payo vector in the core. This
completes the proof.
2
4 Coalition proof Nash equilibria
In the previous section we have seen that in general a large part of the imputation set
of 3-player games can be supported by Nash equilibria of the corresponding link and
claim game. It appeared that the core is a subset of the set of payo vectors that are
supported by Nash equilibria. However, when we consider the strong Nash equilibria of
the link and claim game we nd that under mild conditions on (N;v), only a relatively
small part of the imputation set results, in fact only a relatively small part of the core.
Although all strong Nash equilibria correspond to payo vectors in the core, every strong
Nash equilibrium results in at least one player receiving a payo equal to zero.
In this section we analyze coalition proof Nash equilibria. The set of coalition proof
Nash equilibria is a superset of the set of strong Nash equilibria. The strong Nash
equilibrium concept demands that no coalition can deviate to a prole that improves
the payo for all players in the coalition, with a strict improvement for at least one of
the players. The coalition proof Nash equilibrium concept has similar requirements, but
the set of allowed deviations is restricted. Every player in the deviating coalition should17
strictly improve his payo and the strategy of the deviating players has to be stable with
respect to deviations of subcoalitions.
We will rst show an example to illustrate the coalition proof Nash equilibrium con-
cept and to illustrate the curiosities that arise.
Example 4.1 Consider the game of example 3.2 and the associated link and claim game.
Furthermore consider the payo vector x =( 5 0 ;15;25), which is not supported by any
strong Nash equilibrium.
Consider the following strategy prole that would lead to a communication graph
with player 2 as middleman and x as payo vector, dened by c1 =( P;50;P), c2 =
(c2
1;P;15 − c2
1), with 0  c2
1  15, and c3 =( P;25;P).
Note that the three players divide the value of the grand coalition and that no player
can unilaterally deviate to a strategy that gives him a higher payo. This implies that
we have to consider only deviations by two player coalitions.
First consider a deviation of coalition f1;2g. The sum of the payos to players 1 and
2 is equal to the value of coalition f1;2g. So, to improve their payos, they need to
deviate to a strategy prole where they are connected with player 3. However, given the
strategy of player 3 this implies that player 3 will still receive 25 after the deviation. So
players 1 and 2 cannot deviate and both improve their payos. Since the same reasoning
holds for a deviation of coalition f2;3g, it remains to consider a deviation by coalition
f1;3g.
Players 1 and 3 will deviate only if they can both improve their payos, so the grand
coalition has to be the unique component that forms. To improve their payos they have
to break one of the links with player 2, with a positive claim of player 2 on this link.
Assume without loss of generality that c2
1 > 0 and that the link between players 1 and 2
will be broken, so
^ c
1 =( P;P;50 + c2
1) ; with 0 <<1 ;
^ c
3=( ^ c 3
1 ; ^ c 3






1 and 0 <1−:
However, this deviation is not stable since player 3 can deviate from strategy prole
(^ c1;c 2;^ c 3)b yp l a y i n g~ c 3=( P;25 + c2
1;P), and thus improving his payo from 25 + c2
1
to 25+c2
1 =4 0−c 2
3=v ( f 2 ;3 g )−c 2
3. Since this deviation by player 3 is a coalition proof
Nash equilibrium in the corresponding reduced game, it follows that deviation (^ c1;^ c3)i s
not self-enforcing. Since (^ c1;^ c3) was an arbitrarily chosen deviation it follows that c 2
CPNE(N;v).
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So, we found a coalition proof Nash equilibrium that results in a payo vector in the
core, while this payo vector is not supported by any strong Nash equilibrium. However,
this does not imply that every payo vector in the core can be supported by a coalition
proof Nash equilibrium.
Example 4.2 Consider the game of example 3.2 and the corresponding link and claim
game. Furthermore, consider the payo vector y =( 3 0 ;40;20) which lies in the interior
of the core. This payo vector is not supported by any coalition proof Nash equilibrium.
The proof follows by theorem 4.2 later in this section.
2
The rest of this section is dedicated to the problem of nding all payo vectors corre-
sponding to coalition proof Nash equilibria in the link and claim game associated with a
general 3-person cooperative game. A remarkable result is that we can nd cooperative
games with a coalition proof Nash equilibrium resulting in a payo vector outside the
core.
Theorem 4.2 characterizes the set of payo vectors corresponding to coalition proof
Nash equilibria. The proof of this theorem is divided in several steps and every step is
proven in a lemma.
First we will show that for a large class of 3-person games, all cooperation structures
that are supported by coalition proof Nash equilibria resulting in payo vectors in the
imputation set, have exactly two links.
Lemma 4.1 Let (N;v) be a 3-person cooperative game with associated link and claim
game Γ(v). If v(N) >v ( S ) for all S with jSj = 2, then for all c 2 CPNE(N;v)w i t h
K ( c )2I ( v ) it holds that jL(c)j =2 .
Proof: Suppose v(N) >v ( S ) for all S with jSj =2 . L e tc2CPNE(Γ(v)) with
K(c) 2 I(v). Since v(N) >v ( S ) for all S with jSj =2 ,v ( N )>0, and v(i) = 0 for all
i 2 N, it follows that the grand coalition is the unique component in (N;L(c)). Since
P
i2N Ki(c) > 0a n dC P N E ( Γ ( v ))  NE(Γ(v)) it follows by theorem 3.1 that the graph
(N;L(c)) contains no cycles. We conclude that jL(c)j =2 .
2
In the following lemma we show that all payo vectors in the core that result from
a strong Nash equilibrium can also be supported by a coalition proof Nash equilibrium.
Note that this results holds for general n-person games.
Lemma 4.2 Let (N;v) be a cooperative game with associated link and claim game
Γ(v). For all x 2 C(v)w i t hx i=0f o rap l a y e ri2Nthere exists c 2 CPNE(Γ(N;v))
with K(c)=x .19
Proof: Since every strong Nash equilibrium is a coalition proof Nash equilibrium the
lemma follows from theorem 3.5.
2
If we concentrate on 3-person games again, we nd that, besides the payos that are
also supported by strong Nash equilibria in the corresponding link and claim game, there
is another set of payo vectors that result from coalition proof Nash equilibria in the
corresponding link and claim game.
Lemma 4.3 Let (N;v) be a 3-person cooperative game and x 2 I(v). If at least one
player j receives exactly his marginal contribution, xj = v(N) − v(Nnfjg) and at least
one other player k receives at most his marginal contribution, xk  v(N) − v(Nnfkg),
then there exists c 2 CPNE(N;v)w i t hK ( c )=x .
Proof: Let x 2 I(v) and assume without loss of generality that x2 = v(N) − v(f1;3g)
and x3  v(N) − v(f1;2g). Since x 2 I(v), so x1 + x2 + x3 = v(N), it follows for the
payo of the remaining player that x1  v(f1;2g)+v ( f 1 ;3 g )−v ( N). Consider the




2 =( x 2 ;P;P);
c
3 =( x 3 ;P;P):
Since x1 + x2  v(f1;2g)a n dx 1+x 3=v ( f 1 ;3 g ), coalition f2;3g is the only coalition
that can deviate to a strategy prole that results in a higher payo for all members of
the coalition. Given the strategy of player 1, coalition f2;3g has at most two possibilities
to deviate and obtain a higher payo for both players in the coalition. First, they might
break exactly one of the links with player 1 and form a link within the coalition. Since
c1
3 =0a n dc 1
2>0, player 2 will break the link with player 1. This is represented by the
strategies
^ c
2 =( P;P;x2 + x1) ; with 0 <<1 ;
^ c 3=( ^ c 3
1 ; ^ c 3




2=x 3+x1; 0 <1−:
Provided that the value of the coalition f2;3g is large enough, i.e. v(f2;3g) >x 2+x 3,
they could also form a coalition on their own. This results from the following strategies:
_ c
2 =( P;P; _ c2
3);
_ c
3 =( P; _ c3
2;P);20
with _ c2
3 >x 2,_ c 3
2>x 3,a n d_ c 2
3+_ c 3
2v ( f 2 ;3 g ). Since _ c2
3 >x 2and x1 +x2 + x3 = v(N) 
v(f2;3g) it holds that x3 < _ c3
2 <x 3+x 1.N o wl e t2(0;1) be such that _ c3
2 = x3 + x1.
In both cases player 3 can achieve a further improvement in his payo by breaking
the link with player 2 and forming a link with player 1 only,
~ c
3 =( x 1+x 3;P;P):
Hence, player 3 improves his payo from x3 + x1 to x3 + x1 = v(N) − x2 = v(f1;3g).
Since player 1 claims zero on the link with player 3, the claims on the link f1;3g are
indeed attainable. We conclude that both (^ c2;^ c3)a n d(_ c 2;_ c 3) are not self-enforcing. Since
these were the only possible deviations that would result in higher payos for all members
of the deviating coalition, we conclude that c is a coalition proof Nash equilibrium.
2
In lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 we have seen two sets of payo vectors that result from coalition
proof Nash equilibria in the corresponding link and claim game.
We will now show, for every coalition proof Nash equilibrium that results in a com-
munication graph with exactly two links and a payo vector in the imputation set, that
this payo vector belongs to the union of the two sets described by lemmas 4.2 and 4.3.
For convenience we will denote the middleman by i and the two other players by
j and k. Then the strategies we have to consider are of the following type, where
cm =( c m
i ;c m
j ;c m




























k = P or ck






The following two lemmas deal with the games and strategies described above.
Lemma 4.4 Let (N;v) be a 3-person cooperative game with associated link and claim
game Γ(v) and strategy prole c resulting in a communication graph with exactly
two links and middleman player i.I f c i
j + c i
k=0a n dK ( c )2I ( v ) n C ( v ), then
c 62 CPNE(Γ(v)).
Proof: Suppose K(c) 2 I(v)nC(v)a n dc i
j+c i
k= 0. Then, using the fact that v(fig)=
v ( f j g )=v ( f k g ) = 0, we nd that at least one of the following three inequalities holds:
c
j
i <v ( f i;jg); (4)
c
k





i <v ( f j;kg): (6)21
Inequality (6) will not hold since c
j
i+ck
i = v(N)a n dv( S)v( N) for all S  N.I n e q u a l -
ities (4) and (5) are of the same type, so assume without loss of generality that inequality
(4) holds. Then, player i can unilaterally improve his payo by playing strategy
^ c
i =( P;v(fi;jg)− c
j
i;P):
We conclude that c 62 CPNE(Γ(v)).
2
The following lemma gives another sucient condition for a strategy prole not to be
a coalition proof Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 4.5 Let (N;v) be a 3-person cooperative game with associated link and claim
game Γ(v) and a strategy prole c resulting in a communication graph with exactly




i 6= v(N) − v(fi;kg), and ck
i 6=
v(N) − v(fi;jg)t h e nc62 CPNE(Γ(v)).








v ( f i;kg) we nd that player i can deviate to a strategy that strictly improves his payo
by breaking exactly one link and claiming the highest possible payo on the other link
(e.g. in the rst case break the link with player k). So c 62 CPNE(Γ(v)).















i  v(fi;kg): (8)





i = v(N), c
j
i 6= v(N) − v(fi;kg), and ck
i 6= v(N) −













i >v ( f i;kg): (10)
Suppose without loss of generality that ci
k > 0. We will construct a self-enforcing devi-
ation for coalition fj;kg.P l a y e r kwill break the link with player i, and players j and
k will form a new link. Furthermore, we have to make sure that both players improve
their payos. Denote x = K(c)a n dl e t
^ c
j=( x j ;P;^ c
j
k) ; with ^ c
j










k =( P;^ ck
j;P) ; with ^ c
k







By construction of ^ cj and ^ ck it follows that ^ c
j
k +^ c k
j =x k+c i
k and hence, the claims are
attainable. Since ci




i−v ( f i;jg) > 0 it follows
that ^ c
j
k > 0a n d^ c k
j >x k, so both players improve their payo.
The deviation is self-enforcing since player k clearly cannot improve his payo any
further, and player j cannot improve his payo any further since ci





k+v(fi;jg)− xi − xj = v(fi;jg). We conclude that c 62 CPNE(Γ(v)). This completes
the proof.
2
We can now characterize payo vectors corresponding to coalition proof Nash equi-
libria of 3-person cooperative games resulting in a communication graph with exactly
two links.
Theorem 4.1 Let (N;v) be a 3-person cooperative game and x 2 IR
N . There exists c 2
CPNE(Γ(v)) with jL(c)j =2a n dK ( c )=xif and only if
x 2 C(v)a n d9 j2N: x j= 0 (11)
or
x 2 I(v); 9j 2 N : xj = v(N) − v(Nnfjg)a n d9 k2N nfjg : xk  v(N) − v(Nnfkg):
(12)
Proof: The if-part of the theorem follows by lemmas 4.2 and 4.3. It remains to show
the only-if-part. If x 62 I(v), then some player could improve his payo by unilaterally
deviating. So, assume that x 2 I(v). Also, assume that c 2 CPNE(Γ(v)) with jL(c)j =2
and K(c)=x . We will show that if (11) is not satised, then (12) is satised. So,
assume that (11) is not satised.
Since two links result, there will be a middleman, say player i. Since condition (11)
is not satised, xj 6= 0, for all j 2 N or there exist j 2 N with xj =0a n dx62 C(v).
First suppose x 62 C(v)a n dt h e r ee x i s tj2Nwith xj = 0. By lemma 4.4 it follows
that xi > 0 and consequently i 6= j. Denote the third player by player k.S i n c ecis a
Nash equilibrium it follows that xi + xj = xi  v(fi;jg)a n dx i+x kv ( f i;kg), since
otherwise player i could deviate to a more protable strategy. By lemma 4.5 it follows
that xj = v(N) − v(fi;kg)o rx k =v ( N )−v ( f i;jg). If v(N) >v ( f i;kg)i tf o l l o w s
that xk = v(N) − v(fi;jg)a n dx j=0<v ( N )−v ( f i;kg) and hence condition (12) is
satised. Otherwise, if v(N)=v ( f i;kg)t h e nx j=v ( N )−v ( f i;kg). Furthermore, since
xi  v(fi;jg) it follows that xk  v(N)−v(fi;jg) and again we conclude that equation
(12) is satised.
Now suppose xj 6=0f o ra l lj2N . By considering the deviation possibilities of the
middleman, player i, it follows that
xi + xj  v(fi;jg)a n dx i+x kv ( f i;kg); (13)23
where players j and k denote the remaining players in the game. By lemma 4.5 it
follows that xj = v(N) − v(fi;kg)o rx k =v ( N )−v ( f i;jg). Assume w.l.o.g. that
xj = v(N)− v(fi;kg).
By (13) and xi + xj + xk = v(N)i tf o l l o w st h a tx iv ( f i;jg)+v(fi;kg)−v(N)a n d
x kv ( N )−v ( f i;jg) so condition (12) is satised. This completes the proof.
2
The following example illustrates the theorem above.
Example 4.3 Consider the game of example 3.2 and the corresponding link and claim
game. With lemma 4.1 it follows that exactly two links result according to a coalition
proof Nash equilibrium with the associated payo vector in the imputation set. Now,
using Theorem 4.1, we can exactly determine the set of payo vectors in the imputation
set, supported by coalition proof Nash equilibria. The payo vectors in the imputation




x1 +x2 =6 0
x 2+x 3 =4 0





Figure 3: Bold parts represent the payo vectors in the imputation set
resulting from coalition proof Nash equilibria in example 4.3
Besides the coalition proof Nash equilibria that result in the formation of two links there
are also coalition proof Nash equilibria that result in the formation of exactly one link.
The following lemma describes this second set of coalition proof Nash equilibria.
However, since only one link will be formed, a strategy prole in this set does not
necessarily result in a payo vector in the imputation set. For a specic link between
two players the attainable payo vectors can be represented by a line segment in I R
N,
with zero payo for the remaining player.24
Lemma 4.6 Let (N;v) be a 3-person cooperative game and x a payo vector. There
exists c 2 CPNE(Γ(v)) with K(c)=xif
9i;j;k 2 N : xi >v ( N)−v ( f j;kg);x iv ( N ) − v ( f j;kg)+v( fi;kg)− v(fi;jg);
xj >v ( N)−v ( f i;kg);x j v ( N ) − v ( f i;kg)+v(fj;kg) − v(fi;jg);
xi + xj = v(fi;jg); and xk =0 :
(14)
Also, if v(N) >v ( f i;jg), then all coalition proof Nash equilibria that result in the unique
link fi;jg belong to the set of payo vectors described by (14).
Proof: Assume without loss of generality that x1 >v ( N )−v ( f 2 ; 3 g ), x1  v(N) −
v(f2;3g)+v(f1;3g)−v(f1;2g), x2 >v ( N)−v ( f 1 ;3 g ), x2  v(N)−v(f1;3g)+v(f2;3g)−
v(f1;2g), x1 + x2 = v(f1;2g), and x3 = 0. Now consider the strategy prole c dened
by
c1 =( P;x1;v(N)−v(f1;2g));
c2 =( x 2 ;P;v(N)−v(f1;2g));
c
3 =( P;P;P);
so that K(c)=x . No player can unilaterally deviate to a strategy that gives him
a higher payo. Consider an arbitrary self-enforcing deviation of the grand coalition,
which improves the payos of all players. Obviously, all players will receive a positive
payo after this deviation. Then it follows that exactly two links will form, since all
players have to be connected since they all receive a positive payo and by theorem 3.1
no cycles will result. Since the strategy prole is self-enforcing no player can achieve
a further improvement in his payo by unilaterally deviating from this self-enforcing
strategy prole. This implies that the players divide the value of the grand coalition.
Thus, the self-enforcing strategy prole appears to be a coalition proof Nash equilibrium.
Then, by theorem 4.1 it follows that at least two players will receive at most their
marginal contribution to the grand coalition. Hence, at least one of the players 1 and
2 will receive a lower payo according to the deviation. We conclude that there is no
self-enforcing deviation of the grand coalition that gives all players a higher payo.
Since coalition f1;2g has no possibility to deviate to a strategy prole that results
in a higher payo for both players it remains to consider deviations by coalitions f1;3g
and f2;3g.
Consider a deviation of coalition f2;3g where they form a communication component
on their own,
^ c
2 =( P;P;x2 + (v(f2;3g) − x2)) ; with 0 <<1 ;
^ c
3=( P;(v(f2;3g)− x2);P) ; with 0 <1−:25
Note that x2 = v(f1;2g) − x1  v(N) − x1 <v ( f 2 ;3 g ). Hence, deviation (^ c2;^ c3)r e s u l t s
in a strictly higher payo for both players. However, player 3 can achieve a further payo
improvement by playing
~ c3 =( v ( f 1 ;2 g )+v( f 1 ;3 g )−v( N) ;P;P);
since c1
3 +~ c 3
1=v( f 1 ;3 g )a n d
 ( v ( f 2 ;3 g )−x 2)<v ( f 2 ;3 g )−x 2v ( f 1 ;2 g )+v( f 1 ;3 g )−v( N) :
The last equation follows since x2  v(N)−v(f1;3g)+v(f2;3g)−v(f1;2g). We conclude
that the deviation (^ c2;^ c3) is not self-enforcing.
Coalition f2;3g can also deviate to a strategy prole where the communication com-
ponent f1;2;3g is formed. First, consider the deviation that results in the formation of
links f1;3g and f2;3g. This is described by a strategy prole,
_ c
2 =( P;P;x2 + x1) ; with 0 <<1 ;
_ c
3=( _ c 3
1 ; _ c 3





Here, players 2 and 3 divide v(f1;2g)=x 1+x 2since c1
3 = v(N) − v(f1;2g). This
deviation is not self-enforcing since
x1 <x 1=v ( f 1 ;2 g )−x 2<v ( f 1 ;2 g )+v( f 1 ;3 g )−v( N) ;
so player 3 improves his payo by playing ~ c3.
Secondly, if and only if v(N) >v ( f 1 ; 2 g ), coalition f2;3g can deviate to a strategy
prole that results in the formation of the links f1;2g and f2;3g and both players
receiving a strictly higher payo. This is described by
 c
2 =(  c 2
1 ;P; c 2




3=x 2+ ( v( N)−v( f 1 ;2 g ));0 <<1 ;
 c
3=( P; c3
2;P) ; with  c
3
2 = (v(N) − v(1;2));0 <1−:
Since x1 >v ( N )−v ( f 2 ;3 g ), the sum of the payos to players 2 and 3 will be strictly
less than v(f2;3g), so player 2 can break the link with player 1 and improve his payo.
Finally, note that it is not possible for coalition f2;3g to deviate to a strategy prole
that results in the formation of the links f1;2g and f1;3g and both players improving
their payo.
Since the deviation possibilities of coalition f1;3g are similar to the deviation possi-
bilities of coalition f2;3g it follows that deviations by coalition f1;3g are also not stable.
This proves the rst part of the theorem.26
Now, suppose there exist two players i;j 2 N: v(N) >v ( f i;jg). Assume without loss
of generality that v(N) >v ( f 1 ;2 g ). We will show by contradiction that every coalition
proof Nash equilibrium that results in the unique link f1;2g belongs to the set described
by (14) with i =1 ,j=2 ,a n dk=3 . L e tcbe a coalition proof Nash equilibrium that
results in the formation of exactly one link, f1;2g and assume that K(c)d o e sn o tb e l o n g
to the set described by (14) with i =1 ,j=2 ,a n dk= 3. Without loss of generality we
can distinguish two cases:
(i) K1(c)=c 1
2v ( N)−v ( f 2 ;3 g ) ;
( ii) K1(c)=c 1
2<v ( N)−v ( f 2 ;3 g )+v( f 1 ;3 g )−v( f 1 ;2 g ) ;
K 1( c )>v ( N)−v ( f 2 ;3 g ) ; and K2(c) >v ( N)−v ( f 1 ;3 g ) :
Since c is a coalition proof Nash equilibriumby assumption, it holds that K1(c)+K2(c)=
v ( f 1 ;2 g ). Furthermore, since player 3 cannot unilaterally deviate to a strategy that gives
him a higher payo it holds that ci
3  v(N) − v(f1;2g)o rc i
3=Pfor i =1 ;2 :
Firstly, consider (i). Consider the following deviation of players 2 and 3:
 c
2 =( c 2
1 +  ( v ( N ) − v ( f 1 ; 2 g ));P;0) ; with 0 <<1 ;
 c
3=( P;(1 − )(v(N)− v(f1;2g));P):
Since K2(c1; c2; c3)+K 3( c 1; c 2; c 3)=v ( N )−c 1
2v ( N )−v ( N )+v ( f 2 ;3 g )=v ( f 2 ;3 g )
and c1
3  v(N) − v(f1;2g)o rc 1
3=Pplayers 2 and 3 have no opportunity to achieve
a further improvement in their payo and hence, this deviation is self-enforcing. Since
both players improved their payo by playing ( c2; c3), c is not a coalition proof Nash
equilibrium.
Secondly, consider (ii). Now, consider the following deviation of players 1 and 3.
^ c
1 =( P;P;v(N) − v(f2;3g)+v( f 1 ;3 g )−v( f 1 ;2 g ));
^ c
3 =( v ( f 2 ; 3 g )+v( f 1 ;2 g )−v( N) ;P;P):
Player 1 cannot unilaterally improve his payo any further since c2
1 >v ( N)−v ( f 1 ;3 g ).
Since
v(N) − v(f2;3g) <K 1( c )<v ( N)−v ( f 2 ;3 g )+v( f 1 ;3 g )−v( f 1 ;2 g )
it follows that v(f1;3g) >v ( f 1 ;2 g ). This implies that c2
3 >v ( N )−v ( f 1 ;2 g )>v ( N )−
v ( f 1 ;3 g ), so player 3 cannot improve his payo by deviating to a strategy that results in
the links f1;3g and f2;3g. Furthermore, player 3 cannot improve his payo by deviating











>v ( N ) − v ( f 1 ; 2 g )+v( f 2 ;3 g )+v( f 1 ;2 g )−v( N)=v ( f 2 ;3 g ) :27
Hence, (^ c1;^ c3) is self-enforcing. This implies that c is not a coalition proof Nash equilib-
rium. This completes the proof.
2
Note that there exists a payo vector x satisfying condition (14) only if the core of
the underlying game is empty, since if (14) holds then
v(fi;jg)=x i+x j>v ( N)−v ( f i;kg)+v(N)−v(fj;kg);
and hence, v(fi;jg)+v( fi;kg)+v( fj;kg) > 2v(N) so the balancedness condition for a
zero-normalized game is not satised. Further it can be shown that the reverse statement
also holds, if the core is empty there exists a payo vector x satisfying condition (14).4
Lemma 4.7 describes the necessary and sucient conditions on a 3-person cooperative
game for the existence of a coalition proof Nash equilibrium in the corrresponding link
and claim game resulting in the empty graph and the payo vector (0;0;0).
Lemma 4.7 Let (N;v) be a 3-person cooperative game and x a payo vector. The
empty graph and payo vector x result from a strategy prole c 2 CPNE(Γ(v)) if and
only if
9S;T  N; S 6= T; jSj=jTj=2 ;v ( S )=v ( T)=v ( N) ; and x =( 0 ;0 ;0): (15)
Proof: First we will prove the only-if-part. Let N = f1;2;3g. Assume w.l.o.g. that
v(f1;2g)  v(f2;3g)  v(f1;3g). If v(N) >v ( f 2 ; 3 g )>0t h e nxwith x1 = v(N) −
v(f2;3g), x2 =m i n
n
1
2v ( f 2 ;3 g ) ;v(N)−v(f1;3g)
o
,a n dx 3=v ( f 2 ;3 g ) − x 2is supported by
a coalition proof Nash equilibrium(see theorem 4.1). If v(N)=v ( f 1 ;2 g )a n dv( f 2 ;3 g )=
v ( f 1 ;3 g ) = 0, then there is no coalition proof Nash equilibrium c resulting in payo
vector (0;0;0), since then (^ c1;^ c2)w i t h^ c 1 =( P; 1
2v(N);P)a n d^ c 2 =( 1
2 v ( N ) ;P;P)i s
a self-enforcing deviation that strictly improves the payos of both players 1 and 2.
Finally, consider the case v(N) >v ( f 1 ;2 g )a n dv ( f 2 ;3 g=v ( f 1 ;3 g )=0 . T h e nx ,w i t h
x 1=x 2=1
2v ( f 1 ;2 g )a n dx 3=v ( N )−v ( f 1 ;2 g ), is supported by a coalition proof Nash
equilibrium (see theorem 4.1). Hence, we can always nd a self-enforcing deviation from
a strategy prole resulting in payo vector (0;0;0) if condition (15) is not satised. We
conclude that there is no coalition proof Nash equilibrium that results in payo vector
(0;0;0) if condition (15) is not satised.
To prove the if-part, rst consider the case with exactly one two-person coalition
receiving a smaller value than the grand coalition. Assume without loss of generality
4Assume that the core is empty and assume w.l.o.g. that v(fi;jg)  v(fi;kg)  v(fj;kg). Then
x with xi = v(N) − v(fj;kg)+1
2[ v ( f i;jg)+v ( f i;kg)+v ( f j;kg) − 2v(N)], xj = v(N) − v(fi;kg)+
1
2[ v ( f i;jg)+v( f i;kg)+v ( f j;kg) − 2v(N)], and xk = 0 belongs to the set described by (14).28




2 =( v ( N ) ;P;0);
c3 =(
v ( N )
2
;
v ( N )
2
;P):
Clearly, c results in the empty graph and payo vector (0;0;0). We will show that
c 2 CPNE(Γ(v)). It is obvious that an individual player cannot improve his payo by
unilaterally deviating. Since every self-enforcing strategy prole of the grand coalition
in which all players improve their payos, results in a connected graph with the sum of
the payos equal to the value of the grand coalition, it follows that such a self-enforcing
strategy prole is a coalition proof Nash equilibrium. Since there is only one two-player
coalition with a smaller value than the value of the grand coalition it follows that there is
no coalition proof Nash equilibrium with all players receiving a (strictly) positive payo,
since, according to theorem 4.1, such a coalition proof Nash equilibrium should result
in a player receiving his marginal contribution and another player receiving at most his
marginal contribution, so at least one player should receive zero payo. It remains to
consider deviations by two-player coalitions.
Consider an arbitrary deviation of coalition f1;3g, in which both players improve
their payos. Firstly, they can form communication component f1;3g. Then, player 3
can achieve a further improvement in his payo by playing (P;v(N);P)w h i c hl e a v e s
player 1 isolated. Secondly, if players 1 and 3 form communication component f1;2;3g,
player 1 will not be directly linked with player 2 since c2
1 = v(N). Again player 3 can
improve his payo further by playing (P;v(N);P), leaving player 1 isolated. We have
now considered all deviations of coalition f1;3g that improve the payo of both players
in the coalition.
Since the deviation possibilities of coalition f2;3g are similar to those of coalition
f1;3g it remains to consider deviations by coalition f1;2g. Firstly, if players 1 and 2
form communication component f1;2g, at least one player in the coalition f1;2g receives
strictly less than
v(N)
2 ,s i n c ev ( f 1 ; 2 g )<v ( N ), and hence, this player can improve his
payo by playing (P;P;
v(N)
2 ). If they form communication component f1;2;3g the mid-
dleman will receive less than
v(N)
2 since player 3 receives
v(N)
2 and the remaining player
receives a positive payo. Hence, the middleman can improve his payo by playing
(P;P;
v(N)
2 ). We have now considered all protable deviations by coalition f1;2g and we
conclude that c 2 CPNE(Γ(v)).
Finally, let v(S)=v ( N ), for all jSj =2 . C o n s i d e r^ cwith ^ c1 =( P;v(N);0), ^ c2 =
(0;P;v(N)), and ^ c3 =( v ( N ) ;0 ;P). By theorem 4.1 it follows that there is no coalition29
proof Nash equilibrium resulting in a positive payo for all players. So there is no self-
enforcing deviation of the grand coalition resulting in a positive payo for all players. A
deviation of a two-person coalition is not stable since the third player claims zero on one
of the links. Obviously, a player cannot unilaterally improve his payo. We conclude
that c is a coalition proof Nash equilibium. This completes the proof.
2
The following theorem describes all payo vectors supported by coalition proof Nash
equilibria in a link and claim game corresponding to a 3-person cooperative game.
Theorem 4.2 Let (N;v) be a 3-person cooperative game and x a payo vector. There
exists c 2 CPNE(Γ(v)) with K(c)=xif and only if at least one of the conditions (11),
(12), (14) and (15) is satised.
Proof: By theorem 3.1 it follows that no cycles will result according to a Nash
equilibrium5 and hence, no cycles will result according to a coalition proof Nash e-
quilibrium. Theorem 4.1, lemma 4.6 and lemma 4.7 then characterize all payo vec-
tors attainable according to all communication structures that can result. Note that if
v(N)=v ( f i;jg) then the payo vector corresponding to a coalition proof Nash equilib-
rium resulting in the unique link fi;jg might not belong to the set described by (14).
Therefore, assume v(N)=v ( f i;jg) and consider x = K(c), where x does not belong to
the set described by (14). Then, assume without loss of generality that
xi  v(N) − v(fj;kg)
or
xi <v ( N ) − v ( f j;kg)+v( fi;kg)− v(fi;jg)
= v(fi;kg)− v(fj;kg)
 v(N) − v(fj;kg):




The one-stage game in this paper describes the simultaneous determination of a co-
operation structure and payo distribution for a given cooperative game. It appears,
according to the Nash equilibrium concept, that the resulting cooperation structures
5We remind the reader that v(N) > 0.30
will essentially be cycle-free. The notion that the full cooperation structure will not
necessarily result, conforms with the structures Aumann and Myerson (1988) nd for
their two-stage model.
Since the Nash equilibrium concept usually results in a large set of possible payo
vectors and several possible cooperation structures, we also looked at strong Nash equi-
libria and coalition proof Nash equilbria. The strong Nash equilibrium concept seems
to be too restrictive for this model. For a large set of cooperative games we nd that
a strong Nash equilibrium strategy results in at least one player receiving zero payo.
Actually, we nd that one of the players receiving zero payo will be connected with
several other players, possibly even with all other players. The fact that a player with a
central position in the cooperation structure receives zero payo contradicts for example
the allocation the Myerson value attributes to the players. According to the Myerson
value, a player usually benets from a central position.
Finally, we looked at coalition proof Nash equilibria, concentrating on 3-person games.
It appears that several cooperation strucures are supported by coalition proof Nash
equilibria. The emptygraph forms only under severe restrictions on the underlying game.
The graph with exactly one link is supported by a coalition proof Nash equilibrium if
the core of the underlying game is empty. If there is no coalition with a larger value
than the value of the grand coalition, then we can always nd a coalition proof Nash
equilibrium resulting in a cooperation structure with exactly two links. These structures
do not conform to the structures Dutta et al. (1996) nd for their model. They consider
a two-stage model and conclude that, according to the coalition proof Nash equilibrium
concept, only strategy proles that result in the same payo vector as the strategy prole
resulting in the full graph will be played.
The model in this paper predicts, according to the coalition proof Nash equilibrium
concept, that the middleman will never receive a payo larger than his marginal contri-
bution to the grand coalition. However, we nd that one of the other players may receive
more than his marginal contribution to the grand coalition. Again this contradicts the
Myerson value, where a player usually benets from his central position. Note that all
payo vectors on the boundary of the core are supported by coalition proof Nash equi-
libria. However, there exists no payo vector in the interior of the core supported by a
coalition proof Nash equilibrium. Finally, it holds that every combination of an extreme
point of the core with all players receiving a positive payo and a cooperation structure
with exactly two links is supported by a coalition proof Nash equilibrium.
Summarizing, we have analyzed a simple one-stage model of link formation and payo
distribution. Opposed to a number of models in the existing literature, the division of31
the prot is left to the players. We nd that players do not always prot from a central
position in a cooperation structure, or even stronger, we nd that players in central
positions are exploited.
References
Aumann, R. and R. Myerson (1988). Endogenous formation of links between
players and coalitions: an application of the Shapley value. In: The Shapley value
(Ed. A. Roth), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 175-
191.
Binmore, K. (1985). Bargaining and coalitions. In: Game Theoretic Models of
Bargaining, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 269-304.
Borm, P. and S. Tijs (1992). Strategic claim games corresponding to an NTU-game.
Games and Economic Behavior 4, 58-71.
Chatterjee, K., B. Dutta, D. Ray, and K. Sengupta (1993). A Non-Cooperative
Theory of Coalitional Bargaining. Review of Economic Studies 60, 463-477.
Dutta, B., A. van den Nouweland, and S. Tijs (1996). Link formation in
cooperative situations. Working paper.
Gul, F. (1989). Bargaining Foundations of the Shapley value. Econometrica 57,
615-636.
Monderer, D. and L. Shapley (1996). Potential games. Games and Economic
Behavior 14, 124-143.
Myerson, R. (1977). Graphs and cooperation in games. Mathematics of Operations
Research 2, 225-229.
Myerson, R. (1991). Game Theory: Analysis of Conﬂict. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Perry, M. and P. Reny (1994). A Non-Cooperative view of Coalition Formation
and The Core. Econometrica 62, 795-817.
Slikker, M., B. Dutta, A. van den Nouweland, S. Tijs (1996). Potential maxi-
mizers and network formation. Working paper, Department of Econometrics and
CentER, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands.